INTRODUCTION
Rapid sensorimotor remapping in response to changing environmental demands on the timescale of seconds or less is a remarkable cognitive ability and a hallmark of executive control. It is, perhaps, most acutely probed when the sensorimotor associations that subjects switch between are direct reversals of each other. This is the case with the pro/antisaccade paradigm (Hallett, 1978) , which has been used extensively to study the neural mechanisms underlying response inhibition and flexible control of behavior in primates (Munoz and Everling, 2004) . In this paradigm, subjects apply one of two sensorimotor associations, each the reverse of the other: in the ''Pro'' task, subjects should associate a peripheral visual target with orienting toward it; in the ''Anti'' task, subjects should associate the visual target with orienting away from it. Switching between the two sensorimotor associations can be very rapid, from one seconds-long trial to the next.
Performance in pro/antisaccade task switching is a sensitive tool for assessing cognitive impairments in various psychiatric disorders (Everling and Fischer, 1998; Hutton and Ettinger, 2006) .
Despite a rich rodent literature in flexible control of behavior (Durstewitz et al., 2010; Floresco et al., 2008; Jaramillo et al., 2014; Karlsson et al., 2012; Kimchi and Laubach, 2009; Rich and Shapiro, 2009; Rodgers and DeWeese, 2014) , response conflict (Haddon et al., 2008; Oualian and Gisquet-Verrier, 2010) , and rapid switching between fixed sensorimotor associations (Baker and Ragozzino, 2014; Leenaars et al., 2012) , reports of cued, rapid remapping of the association between sensory stimuli and motor responses, occurring on the order of hundreds of milliseconds to seconds, are rare in rodents (e.g., Fassihi et al., 2014) . However, such rapidity in sensorimotor remapping, indicative of the speed and flexibility with which information can be rerouted within the brain, is one of the most remarkable features of adaptive behavior. Some particularly notable features of executive control are best isolated when associations are switched from one trial to the next. For example, cueing subjects before each trial with the identity of the association to be used minimizes confusion as to which sensorimotor association they should apply; yet even when very clearly cued, humans are slower and/or more error prone on the first trial immediately following a sensorimotor association change than on repetition trials of the same task. This first-trial effect is known as the ''switch cost'' (Allport et al., 1994; Baker and Ragozzino, 2014; Cherkasova et al., 2002; Leenaars et al., 2012; Rogers and Monsell, 1995; Weiler and Heath, 2012) , and its underlying cause is the focus of a large executive control literature (for reviews, see Kiesel et al., 2010; Monsell, 2003; Vandierendonck et al., 2010) . Two major theories of the origin of the switch cost are as follows. (1) Setting up the new task set is what requires the most time and effort and can only be fully achieved after the arrival of the sensory stimulus in the new task block (''task-set reconfiguration''; Monsell et al., 2000) . (2) Dismantling the old task set is what is difficult; therefore, the switch cost is mostly due to a temporal carryover of the previous task set (''task-set inertia''; Allport et al., 1994) .
Reasoning that a rodent model would facilitate studies of executive control over sensorimotor associations, we developed an approach to train rats to perform a behavior involving singletrial sensorimotor remapping. After a large number of unsuccessful attempts, we found a particular sequence of shaping steps that takes naive rats and successfully trains $80% of the subjects in a rapid task-reversal behavior analogous to the pro/antisaccade paradigm. The training protocol was formalized into computer code, which enables parallelized training of many animals with minimal human intervention and should also greatly facilitate replication of our results since the computerized protocol can be readily downloaded and identically re-run (see Supplemental Information) .
We found that, after training in our sensorimotor remapping paradigm, rats displayed several behavioral asymmetries between Pro and Anti responses. All of these are similar to asymmetries found in primates: Pro was easier to learn than Anti; Pro was faster to execute than Anti; under several (but not all) conditions, Pro performance was better than Anti performance; and rats had an asymmetric switch cost in that the switch from Anti to Pro led to a greater cost than the switch from Pro to Anti. The same switch-cost asymmetry has been observed in the primate pro/antisaccade paradigm (Cherkasova et al., 2002; Everling and DeSouza, 2005; Weiler and Heath, 2012) and in the Stroop task (Allport et al., 1994) . These observations suggest that some of the mechanisms underlying rapid sensorimotor remapping may be comparable across species. They also suggest that, as is thought in primates, Pro orienting in rats is perhaps more reflexive or prepotent, whereas Anti orienting is more cognitively demanding.
To better understand the neural mechanisms underlying this rapid sensorimotor remapping behavior, we conducted inactivations of the superior colliculus (SC) and the prefrontal cortex (PFC), two brain regions thought to be particularly important for ProAnti behavior. In rodents, 70% or more of retinal ganglion cells project to the superficial layers of the contralateral SC (Hofbauer and Drä ger, 1985; Lund et al., 1980) , which, in turn, project to the deeper motor layers on the same side of the SC (May, 2006) -which, in turn, are known to be involved in orienting motions across many species (Felsen and Mainen, 2008; Gandhi and Katnani, 2011; Isa and Sasaki, 2002; Sparks, 1999) . Therefore, the SC is a candidate for mediating fast prepotent responses toward a visual target (Pro). In the human and monkey pro/antisaccade behavior, the PFC has been implicated in Anti responses (Guitton et al., 1985; Johnston and Everling, 2006; McDowell et al., 2008; Munoz and Everling, 2004; Pierrot-Deseilligny et al., 1991) . Consistent with this view, the prelimbic cortex (PL) of the rat medial PFC is thought to play an important role in behavioral inhibition and top-down control of behavior (Marquis et al., 2007; Rich and Shapiro, 2009 ). Accordingly, we hypothesized that rat SC and the PL region of the PFC should have dramatically different contributions to Pro and Anti behaviors: the SC would be most critical for Pro responses, while the PFC would be most critical for Anti responses.
To test this, we reversibly inactivated these regions during the ProAnti remapping behavior. PFC inactivation preferentially impacted Anti performance, as predicted. However, contrary to our expectations, bilateral SC inactivation had a minimal effect on Pro trials. Instead, SC inactivation induced a significant behavioral impairment on Anti trials. SC inactivation also eliminated the cost of switching from Anti to Pro while leaving the cost of switching from Pro to Anti intact. Thus, in support of the ''task-set inertia'' theory of switch cost (Allport et al., 1994) , the data suggest a link between circuits involved in Anti behavior and the cost of switching out of Anti. Together, our results indicate that both SC and PFC play a role in behavioral inhibition and flexible sensorimotor mapping and reveal a surprisingly specific role for the rodent SC in the cognitively demanding Anti task. The SC has been linked to perceptual decision making in both rodents (Felsen and Mainen, 2012) and primates (Horwitz and Newsome, 1999) , and in the primate literature, it has increasingly been linked to higher cognitive processes, including abstract perceptual decisions (Horwitz et al., 2004) , attention (Goldberg and Wurtz, 1972; Zé non and Krauzlis, 2012) , and target selection (McPeek and Keller, 2004) . Our data suggest that, in rodents, the SC may play a similarly important role in higher cognition and, furthermore, add executive control to the list of cognitive processes linked to the SC.
RESULTS

ProAnti Orienting Training and Performance Training
We developed a computerized protocol to train rats to perform both Pro and Anti orienting ( Figure 1 ; Figure S1 ; full training A B Figure 1 . The Cued ProAnti Orienting Behavior (A) Structure of the ProAnti orienting paradigm. On each trial, the identity of the task cue (denoted by an easily distinguished auditory stimulus) indicates whether the rat should orient toward (Pro) or away from (Anti) a subsequent visual target (denoted by a left or right LED) in order to obtain a reward. Tasks can switch from one trial to the next. (B) Behavior timing. A light in the center port indicates that rats should nose poke there to initiate a trial and keep their noses there until the center light offset (''fixation'' period). During the first 1 s of the fixation period, a Pro (P) or Anti (A) sound is played to indicate the current task, followed by a 500-ms silent delay. The center LED is then turned off, indicating that the animal is now free to withdraw from the center port, and the moment it withdraws, a left (L) or right (R) LED is turned on to indicate the target location. RT is defined as the time from target onset until side poke. See also Figure S1 . details and computer code are included in the Supplemental Information). In brief, rats were first trained to good performance on Pro orienting only ( Figure 2A ; Figure S1A ). Alternating blocks of Pro and Anti trials were then introduced. Although we did not perform systematic searches, our pilot studies suggested that two features in this training stage were critical. (1) Switching between blocks of Pro and blocks of Anti trials was performancebased in that it only occurred if performance in the most recent 20 trials was greater than 70% correct. (2) Errors in Anti trials were ''correctable'' in the sense that, on Anti trials, if animals ''nose poked'' into the incorrect side port, they were then required to nose poke at the opposite (correct) side port and, after a short delay, were given a reward there. To incentivize correct performance, this delay to reward after a ''corrected'' side poke was increased gradually over sessions until it reached 6 s. Rats that consistently reached >70% correct on both Pro and Anti trials within single sessions were then moved to a final stage in which errors on both Pro and Anti trials simply led to a brief trial-terminating time-out without any possibility of reward, and switching blocks to the opposite association now occurred sooner, when performance in the most recent 10 trials was greater than 70% correct and a minimum of 15 trials in the block had elapsed ( Figure 2C , left). This final stage was considered the ''fully trained'' stage. Rats performed an average of 11 switches per session, with $20 trials per block. Some fully trained rats proceeded further to one of two stages:
Randomly interleaved ProAnti switching. Pro and Anti trials were fully randomly interleaved, without any block structure ( Figure 2C , right). We found that no further training was needed to move to this stage. Rats performed at their asymptotic level from the first randomly interleaved session (Figure 2A ). Random-length blocks, with no performance criterion. The number of trials in a task block was not based on performance but was determined at the beginning of the block, chosen from a Gaussian distribution (mean = 15, SD = 5, maximum = 25 trials per block; Figure S2A ).
Performance
By design, the performance-based switching paradigm provides more training on the lower accuracy task. In this paradigm, asymptotic performance for Pro (mean ± SEM, 79.5% ± 0.8%) was not significantly different from that for Anti (79.1% ± 1.1%) (bootstrapped p = 0.57, n = 13 rats; Figure 2B , black). In contrast, in the randomly interleaved design, Pro performance (75.5% ± 1.3%) was consistently better than Anti performance (72.4% ± 1.0%, bootstrapped p < 10
À3
, n = 5 rats; Figure 2B , magenta). Asymptotic performance on random-length blocks was 77.7% ± 1.4% in Pro and 76.8% ± 1.4% in Anti ( Figure S2B ). To study switch cost between task blocks, we focus on the two block designs. Before training rats on the full ProAnti task-switching paradigm, we habituated rats on the general paradigm structure on one task only (labeled here as ''Pro-only''). Indicated here are Pro performance (green) and Anti performance (orange) during daily sessions averaged over 13 rats that started with Pro-only training. Rats achieved almost perfect Pro performance over the first few days, after which the Anti task was introduced. 
Behavioral Asymmetries Learning Asymmetry
For a separate group of rats, instead of beginning by training on Pro-only trials first, we began by training them on Anti-only (Figures 2D and S1B) . We found two differences between the Antionly-first group (n = 8 rats) and the Pro-only-first group (n = 13 rats). First, rats that began with Anti required multiple sessions to learn the Anti-only behavior ( Figure 2D , left) and reached an asymptotic Anti-only performance of 91.8% ± 0.6%. In contrast, rats typically learned Pro-only behavior within a single session ( Figure 2A ) and reached a 98.7% ± 0.2% asymptotic performance only one or two sessions later. This suggests that Anti behavior, on its own, is harder to learn than Pro behavior on its own. Second, after task block switches were introduced, none of the rats trained on Anti-only first ever achieved above-chance performance on both tasks. In particular, their Pro task behavior persistently remained at near-chance levels ( Figure 2D , right). This suggests that, after training on the Anti-only behavior, rats were less flexible than after training on the Pro-only behavior.
As a result of their chance performance on Pro trials, no rats in the Anti-first group were considered to have successfully learned the full ProAnti switching behavior, and we do not report further analyses for this group of rats.
Response Time Asymmetry
Despite the similar fraction of correct trials in Pro and Anti tasks within the performance-based switching paradigm, rats executed Pro trials faster than Anti trials. The distribution of response times (RTs, defined as time from visual target onset to side port response) for an example rat is shown in Figure 3A .
Pro hits (median = 0.57 s) were significantly faster than Anti hits (median = 0.68 s, t 20166 = À31.2, p < 10 À10 ). The RT difference between Pro hits and Anti hits was consistent across rats, despite the substantial variability in individual rats' median RT ( Figure 3B , left). On average, rats responded 51 ms faster on Pro hits than on Anti hits (bootstrapped p < 10 À3 , n = 13 rats; Figure 3B , right). This RT difference is similar to RT differences in nonhuman primate pro/antisaccades (Everling et al., 1999) and Pro/Anti reaches (Gail and Andersen, 2006) . On error trials, the RT pattern was more variable: rats were significantly faster on Anti errors than on Anti hits (bootstrapped p < 0.05, n = 13 rats), but RTs for Pro hits and Pro errors were not significantly different (p = 0.27).
Switch-Cost Asymmetry
The performance cost of switching from Anti to Pro blocks was significantly larger than the cost of switching from Pro to Anti blocks ( Figures 3C-3E ). That is, rats made more errors on the first trial of each block (switch trial) than on other trials of the same task block (block trials), and this accuracy drop was significantly larger when switching from Anti to Pro blocks (accuracy drop = 36.5% ± 3.4%, mean ± SEM across rats) than when switching from Pro to Anti blocks (drop = 10.6% ± 2.1%, bootstrapped p < 10 À3 , n = 13 rats; Figure 3D ). Despite the drop in performance on switch trials, rats were clearly changing behavior in response to the task cue on the first trial of a new block: accuracy on switch trials was much higher than the $10% correct that would be expected if rats ignored the task cue (since the pre-switch performance on these performancebased block switches was $90% and the new task is a reversal, we would expect 10% correct on the first trial before the animals get any reward feedback). We also found an asymmetric switch cost in RT ( Figure 3E ). There was a measurable RT switch cost when switching out of Anti and into Pro, in the sense that, on correct Pro trials, animals responded significantly more slowly on the first trial of the Pro task than on Pro block trials (bootstrapped p < 0.01, n = 13 rats). In contrast, Anti hits displayed no significant RT cost for switching out of Pro and into Anti (p = 0.33). The paired difference between Pro / Anti and Anti / Pro hit RT switch costs was significant across rats (bootstrapped p < 10
À3
, n = 13 rats; Figure 3E ). Our results demonstrate that rats show the same switch cost patterns that have been reported in the human pro/antisaccade behavior (Cherkasova et al., 2002; Weiler and Heath, 2012) , as well as in the Stroop task (Allport et al., 1994) . In these behaviors, switching from the harder task (Anti and color naming, respectively) to the easier task (Pro and word naming, respectively) evokes a larger switch cost than the reverse.
Switch Cost in the Random-Block-Length Paradigm
To accurately assess the effect of inactivations, we trained rats targeted for inactivation (n = 6 rats) on the random-block-length design ( Figure S2 ). We reasoned that, if the inactivation resulted in a strong impairment in one task, a performance-based switching policy would leave the animal ''stuck'' in that task, and we would not adequately sample performance on both tasks. In addition to a greater variability in block length than the performance-based design, the random-block-length design also produced task switches after error trials more often than the performance-based design. Thus, the random-block-length design allowed comparing switch costs after short versus long blocks and facilitated the comparison of switch costs after correct versus after error trials.
When animals switched tasks after a short block, there was no asymmetry in switch cost. However, an asymmetry emerged following long blocks ( Figure 4A) . The difference between Pro and Anti accuracy switch costs positively correlated with the block length immediately before switching (r = 0.71, p < 0.005, n = 18 conditions: 6 rats 3 3 bins). To focus on the asymmetric switch cost, we studied switch trials after long blocks (more than eight trials). For such task switches, all six infusion rats had significantly bigger accuracy drop and RT increase when switching from Anti to Pro blocks than during the reverse switch (bootstrapped p < 10 À3 , n = 6 rats; Figures 4B and 4C ).
We then analyzed post-error performance and switch cost ( Figures 4D, 4E , and S3). One possible source of errors is weak representation of the relevant task goal on that trial. Under the task-set inertia theory (Allport et al., 1994) , task-set carryover would thus be reduced after errors, and the post-error switch cost should be smaller than the post-correct switch cost (DeSimone et al., 2014) . As a basis for comparison, we first looked at trials within a block that followed an error (''post-error block trials'') and found that those trials displayed a substantial drop in accuracy compared to post-correct block performance (average post-error block trial performance = 69.0% ± 1.6%, a drop of 13.9% ± 1.1%, mean ± SEM across rats). This drop was not significantly different for Pro versus Anti trials ( Figure 4D ). We then analyzed post-error switch trials. We found that, consonant with the task-set inertia theory's prediction of a reduced switch cost, performance on post-error switch trials was similar to performance on post-error block trials (Figures 4D and 4E ; average performance = 66.4% ± 2.9% on post-error switch trials versus 69.0% ± 1.6% on post-error block trials, indicated by dashed line). A repeated-measures two-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of error, F(1, 5) = 103.9, p < 10 À3 ; and task, F(1, 5) = 34.0, p < 0.005, on switch cost but no significant interaction between error and task (p = 0.15).
Inactivations
After animals were fully trained, we implanted bilateral PFC (prelimbic cortex, PL) and SC (intermediate and deep layers) cannulae in six trained rats ( Figure 5 ; Figure S2C ) and conducted inactivations of these areas with muscimol (a GABA-A agonist) during task performance. The effect of inactivations was quantified by comparing performance during muscimol sessions to the corresponding control sessions 1 day before, thus controlling for any potential effects of the cannulae implantation itself.
Unilateral Inactivations
SC Infusion
Consistent with previous rodent and primate literature indicating the SC's role in orienting movements (Felsen and Mainen, 2008; Hikosaka and Wurtz, 1985) , unilateral SC inactivation led to an impairment in orienting contralaterally to the inactivated side (+27.8% ± 5.4% change in error rate, mean ± SEM across sessions) and a bias toward ipsilateral orienting (À12.6% ± 2.5% change in error rate; Figures 6A and 6B) . The contralateral impairment/ipsilateral bias did not depend on the identity of the task: a repeated-measures two-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of side (Go Contralateral [Go Contra] versus Go Ipsilateral [Go Ipsi]) on error rate increase, F(1, 11) = 18.48, p < 0.005; but no significant effect of task, Pro versus Anti, F(1, 11) = 1.93, p = 0.19; or interaction, F(1, 11) = 0.01, p = 0.94 ( Figure 6B ). We also observed a significant increase in RT on correct contralateral Anti responses (change = 100.2 ± 39.6 ms, t 11 = 2.64, p < 0.05; Figures 6B and S4B) .
PFC Infusion
Consistent with a role in Anti orienting, unilateral PL inactivation led to a greater impairment on Anti trials (+15.1% ± 3.6% change in error rate) than on Pro trials (+3.4% ± 2.0%; Figure 6C ). There was a significant main effect of task on error rate increase, F(1, 11) = 9.21, p < 0.05; but no significant effect of side, F(1, 11) = 1.23, p = 0.29; or interaction between task and side, F(1, 11) < 10 À3 , p = 0.99. No significant change in RT was observed (ps > 0.05; Figures 6C and S4D) . 
Bilateral SC Inactivation
The results from unilateral SC inactivation are consistent with the hypothesis that the SC is a critical element of the Pro pathway, but they are also consistent with the possibility that imbalanced competition between the two sides of SC leads to a general orienting deficit. To distinguish between these two hypotheses, we conducted bilateral inactivation. The first hypothesis predicts a significant Pro impairment after bilateral SC inactivation, whereas the second hypothesis predicts a recovery of Pro performance.
We found that bilateral SC inactivation dramatically reduced the large Pro impairment seen after unilateral inactivation. The bilateral inactivation produced only a modest error rate increase on Pro trials (+4.9% ± 1.2%, mean ± SEM across sessions; triangles in Figures 7Ai and 7Bi) that was not significantly different from that for saline infusions (t 36 = 0.92, p = 0.37; Figure S5Aii) . Surprisingly, and in contrast to the result for Pro trials, bilateral SC inactivation produced a major impairment on Anti trials (+24.8% ± 3.2%, t 27 = 7.82, p < 10 À7 ). This robust Anti impairment was observed for all rats (bootstrapped p < 10 À3 , n = 5 rats; Figure 7Ci ). There was no correlation between baseline Anti performance and the magnitude of Anti impairment (r = 0.07, p = 0.92, n = 28 sessions), suggesting that the observed task-specific effect was not merely a general difficulty deficit, a point that we revisit in the Discussion section. Rats slowed down after bilateral SC inactivation, even when they correctly performed Pro or Anti motions (RT increase compared to control on Pro trials: 50.5 ± 17.4 ms, t 27 = 2.95, p < 0.01; RT increase compared to controls on Anti trials: 37.4 ± 20.3 ms, t 27 = 1.88, p = 0.07; Figure 7Di ). Rats also slowed down on Pro errors (77.0 ± 22.9 ms, t 27 = 3.43, p < 0.01) but did not significantly slow down on Anti errors (19.6 ± 22.3 ms, t 27 = 0.90, p = 0.38).
Bilateral PFC Inactivation
Because the rat PL plays a non-lateralized role in the ProAnti behavior ( Figure 6C ), unilateral inactivation may have failed to reveal some behavioral deficits due to compensation from the contralateral PL. To address this concern, we performed bilateral PL inactivation. We found a larger error rate increase on Anti trials than what had been obtained by unilateral inactivation (+27.7% ± 2.8%, compared to control; t 27 = 9.93, p < 10 À9 ; circles in Figures 7Aii and 7Bii) . After bilateral PL inactivation, we also observed a significant impairment in Pro performance (+10.6% ± 2.4%, t 27 = 4.60, p < 10 À4 ). Nonetheless, rats continued to be substantially more impaired on Anti trials than on Pro trials (paired t test, t 27 = 5.59, p < 10 À5 ).
Rats were faster on Pro hits, Anti hits, and Anti errors after bilateral PL inactivation, compared to control sessions (RT decrease on Pro hits: 42.4 ± 17.1 ms, t 27 = À2.52, p < 0.05; RT decrease on Anti hits: 78.5 ± 20.2 ms, t 27 = À3.96, p < 10 À3 ; RT decrease on Anti errors: 68.4 ± 20.4 ms, t 27 = À3.41, p < 0.01; Figure 7Dii ), but there was no significant RT change for Pro errors (11.1 ± 20.7 ms, p = 0.59).
Additional control experiments confirmed that the effect of PFC infusion was mainly due to PL inactivation and not due to backflow of muscimol along the cannula tract into the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; Figures S5Aiv and S5Biv).
Effect of Inactivations on Switch Cost
The selective impairment of Anti performance after bilateral SC or bilateral PFC inactivations suggested that the dominant effect of these inactivations is to disrupt the circuit necessary for Anti behavior. Assuming that this is the circuit underlying the Anti task set, this provided the opportunity to causally test whether carryover from the Anti task set is what leads to the switch cost on subsequent Pro switch trials, as predicted by the taskset inertia theory. To eliminate the confounding effect of errors on switch cost, we focused our analysis on post-correct switch trials only. Remarkably, we found that bilateral SC inactivation completely eliminated the cost of switching to Pro blocks (permutation test, p < 10 À3 , Figures 8A-8C ). In contrast, despite the general deficit in Anti performance after SC inactivation, the cost of switching to Anti blocks remained the same as control (p = 0.99). In other words, a single manipulation selectively affected both Anti performance and the cost of switching out of Anti, while it left Pro performance and the cost of switching out of Pro (i.e., switching to Anti) unchanged. A similar pattern of results was found after bilateral PFC inactivation, which, compared to control sessions, significantly reduced the cost of switching out of Anti blocks (permutation test, p < 0.05; Figures  8D-8F ), while the cost of switching out of Pro blocks remained unchanged (p = 0.68).
DISCUSSION
We established a rodent model of rapid switching between two familiar pairs of stimulus-action associations. The two pairs are reversals of each other: the Pro task requires associating a left light with orienting left, and associating a right light with orienting right. In contrast, the Anti task associates the left light with orienting right, and the right light with orienting left (Figure 1) . A switch from one task to the other thus requires re-routing stimulusinduced neural activity from one associated response to its opposite. Following an automated protocol, rats were trained to perform cued Pro and Anti trials in interleaved blocks. Without further training, rats successfully performed randomly intermingled Pro and Anti trials (Figure 2) . Thus, rats can switch the action associated with a stimulus immediately after the change in task cue without any error-driven re-learning. This differs from most behavioral flexibility studies in rodents, in which uncued set shifts or stimulus-action reversals are indicated by errors, and behavior changes gradually over multiple trials (Durstewitz et al., 2010; Floresco et al., 2008; Kimchi and Laubach, 2009; Ragozzino et al., 1999; Rich and Shapiro, 2007) . Our task also differs from more recent task-switching studies, in which stimulus-action associations are kept constant across the experiment (Baker and Ragozzino, 2014; Leenaars et al., 2012) , and a task switch, therefore, does not require re-routing neural activity from one stimulus / action pathway to another. Finally, our task differs from response conflict studies in which either behavior changes slowly over many trials (Oualian and Gisquet-Verrier, 2010) or each trial itself unfolds over more than a minute (Haddon et al., 2008) . In these latter tasks, slow timescale mechanisms could be involved in response switching.
Reversing associations on the rapid timescale used here-a second or lessmakes rodent task switching equally as fast as those used in comparable human and non-human primate behaviors, facilitating cross-species comparisons. Furthermore, rapid switching significantly constrains the neural mechanisms that can underlie the reversal. For example, changes in structural connections between neurons or in gene expression would be too slow and can, therefore, be ruled out. Rapid switching may involve macrocircuits that are different from those required for switching on slower timescales: multiple groups have found that performance in a reversal learning paradigm, which occurs over many trials, does not require the medial PFC (mPFC) (Floresco et al., 2008; Rich and Shapiro, 2007) . In contrast, we found that Anti performance during rapid stimulus-action reversals was substantially impaired after mPFC inactivation (Figures 6, 7, and 8) .
Rats displayed several asymmetries between Pro and Anti responses, similar to observations in the primate pro/antisaccade behavior (Munoz and Everling, 2004) . Pro was easier to learn than Anti ( Figure 2) ; Pro was faster to execute than Anti ( Figures  3A and 3B) ; under several (but not all) conditions, Pro performance was better than Anti performance ( Figure 2B) ; and rats had an asymmetric switch cost ( Figures 3C-3E ), meaning that performance on the first trial of a block was impaired compared to performance on trials within blocks, and this switch cost was greater when switching from Anti to Pro than from Pro to Anti (Cherkasova et al., 2002; Everling and DeSouza, 2005; Weiler and Heath, 2012) . As in primates, these asymmetries support Pro responses as prepotent and Anti responses as more cognitively demanding in these trained animals.
Causal Perturbations and Support for the Task-Set Inertia Theory
The robust asymmetric switch cost in accuracy and RT ( Figures  3D and 3E ) is consistent with other human task-switching paradigms such as the Stroop task (Wylie and Allport, 2000) . This asymmetry has been interpreted as support for the task-set inertia theory of switch cost (Allport et al., 1994) , which posits that dismantling the old task set is difficult and, therefore, switch cost is mostly due to a temporal carryover of the previous task set. The other major theory of switch cost is the ''task-set reconfiguration'' theory, which proposes that setting up the new task set is what requires time and effort and can only be fully achieved after the arrival of the sensory stimulus in the new task block (Monsell et al., 2000; Rogers and Monsell, 1995) . Our muscimol infusions supported the task-set inertia theory in that they revealed that disrupting the Anti circuit eliminated the cost of switching out of Anti but left the cost of switching to Anti intact (Figure 8 ). To our knowledge, this is the first causal evidence for the task-set inertia theory. In addition, when Anti orienting was impaired, the first Pro trial was as accurate as the later Pro trials, indicating that full switching to Pro could occur before completing the first Pro trial, arguing against the task-set reconfiguration theory. An alternative interpretation could be that, after bilateral inactivations, animals were only performing Pro orienting and, therefore, never switched between the two tasks. We found this explanation unlikely. First, there was still a significant switch cost from Pro to Anti tasks after bilateral inactivations (Figure 8 ), suggesting that, despite a general Anti impairment, animals were switching between the two tasks. Second, bilateral inactivations did not result in a near-zero Anti accuracy or an improvement in Pro accuracy, so animals did not adopt the strategy of only performing Pro orienting after inactivations. Therefore, for rats in the ProAnti task-switching behavior, the switch cost is dominated by task-set inertia. Changing task parameters may shift the source of the switch cost (Yeung and Monsell, 2003) .
We found that rat behavior recapitulated a further result recently reported in humans (DeSimone et al., 2014) in that the cost of switching out of Anti only occurred after correct Anti trials but not after Anti errors ( Figure 4E ). Furthermore, we found that, if the neural structures necessary for Anti behavior were impaired, the cost of switching out of Anti was eliminated, even after correct Anti responses (Figure 8 ). This causal manipulation result suggests that a correct Anti motor act is not sufficient to induce a switch cost and that the critical requirement for the cost of switching out of Anti is the Anti task set itself, consistent with Yeung et al.'s (2014) interpretation of their behavioral data in humans.
The Role of PL Perturbation (Floresco et al., 2008; Haddon and Killcross, 2006; Joel et al., 1997; Marquis et al., 2007; Oualian and 2007; Seamans et al., 1995) and physiology (Durstewitz et al., 2010; Karlsson et al., 2012; Rich and Shapiro, 2009; Rodgers and DeWeese, 2014) studies suggest a role of rat PL in cognitive control of behavior. We showed that rat PL is important for maintaining the overall performance during rapid sensorimotor remapping, with a preferential involvement in the Anti task. If PL were primarily necessary for switching, we would have expected bigger switch costs after PL inactivation. Instead, PL inactivation reduced the cost of switching out of Anti and did not affect the cost of switching out of Pro (Figure 8 ). This suggests a more important role for PL in task-set maintenance than in actively driving the switching of stimulus-action associations per se. This interpretation is consistent with single-unit recordings in rat mPFC that indicate its role in representing the current task goal (Durstewitz et al., 2010; Rodgers and DeWeese, 2014) , especially for the cognitively demanding Anti task. We also confirmed that the effect of mPFC inactivation was mainly due to PL impairment, not ACC (Figures S5Aiv and S5Biv) , demonstrating a similarity between the rat data and a recent comparison of cooling dorsolateral PFC (dlPFC) and ACC in a monkey pro/antisaccade paradigm .
The Role of SC The intermediate and deep layers of SC, across many species, have been implicated as essential for controlling orienting behaviors (Gandhi and Katnani, 2011; Isa and Sasaki, 2002; Sparks and Hartwich-Young, 1989; Sparks, 1999) . Permanent or reversible lesions of the deep layers of unilateral SC resulted in contralateral orienting deficits (Felsen and Mainen, 2008; Hikosaka and Wurtz, 1985; 1986; Sinnamon and Garcia, 1988; Sprague and Meikle, 1965) , including increased latency and error of orienting movements. Our unilateral SC inactivation confirmed its importance in general orienting responses ( Figure 6B ), even in the context of a sophisticated executive control paradigm. The selective slowing of contralateral Anti responses revealed a subtle task selectivity that was otherwise dominated by the lateralized effect.
As described in the Introduction, rodent SC anatomy literature motivated our prediction that bilateral SC inactivation would impair Pro responses and, consequently, facilitate Anti responses. In contrast, we found that Pro responses were left largely intact, while Anti responses were strongly impaired (Figure 7) . The recovery of Pro performance after bilateral SC inactivation is reminiscent of the reduction in the behavioral impairment induced by unilateral lesions or inactivations when the opposite SC is lesioned or silenced in rats (Sinnamon and Garcia, 1988) and cats (Lomber et al., 2001 ), but here, it occurs together with a simultaneous impairment in Anti responses in the context of a ProAnti switching behavior. It should be noted that correct Pro responses were slower after bilateral SC inactivation, suggesting that the SC is involved in Pro orienting under normal conditions but that there are alternative pathways to support the choice of right versus left orienting in what may be an important naturalistic behavior. One such pathway may originate from premotor cortex (Erlich et al., 2011) and may project to brainstem nuclei involved in orienting other than the SC (Schiller et al., 1979) .
The major Anti impairment after bilateral SC inactivation reveals the SC as necessary for Anti orienting responses. This was not a non-specific impairment due to Anti being a harder task than Pro for two reasons. First, there was no correlation between Anti accuracy (a measure of subjective difficulty) on control days and Anti impairment on infusion days. Second, on control days, the hardest trial type of all (i.e., the trial type with the lowest percent correct) is the first trial of a Pro block; yet performance in these difficult trials was markedly improved after bilateral SC inactivation. Therefore, greater trial difficulty did not lead to a greater impairment. Our data add to the growing list of cognitive functions associated with the SC, including perceptual decision making in both primates (Horwitz and Newsome, 1999) and rodents (Felsen and Mainen, 2012) and, in primates, abstract perceptual decisions (Horwitz et al., 2004) , attention (Goldberg and Wurtz, 1972; Zé non and Krauzlis, 2012) , target selection (McPeek and Keller, 2004) , and others. Within the ProAnti behavior, future experiments will be needed to distinguish whether the SC is primarily required for the implementation of Anti motor act after the appearance of the target stimulus or whether the SC is necessary for the maintenance of the Anti task set itself.
Interactions between PFC and SC In the human and monkey pro/antisaccade behavior, it has been hypothesized that PFC prevents stimulus-driven Pro responses via suppression of neural activity in the SC during Anti performance (the ''inhibition model''; Pierrot-Deseilligny et al., 1991) . The inhibition model of prefrontal function in the antisaccade task has been widely supported by human lesion studies (Guitton et al., 1985; Pierrot-Deseilligny et al., 1991) , human functional imaging studies (McDowell et al., 2008) , and non-human primate neurophysiological recordings (Dorris et al., 1997; Everling et al., , 1999 Johnston and Everling, 2006) . However, recent perturbation experiments in the primate PFC have started to question the long-held inhibition model (Condy et al., 2007; Wegener et al., 2008; Johnston et al., 2014) . Notably, Johnston and colleagues (2014) simultaneously cooled PFC while recording in the SC and showed that, contrary to the inhibition model, PFC activity had an excitatory effect on SC saccade-related neurons. Although we did not directly test the interactions between PFC and SC in the present study, our rat SC inactivation results are consistent with and complementary to these recent challenges to the inhibition model: in contrast to the inhibition model, silencing the SC did not promote Anti responses but instead impaired them. Together, our rodent SC inactivation data and the primate PFC perturbation data (Condy et al., 2007; Wegener et al., 2008; Johnston et al., 2014) argue against the long-held view that suppression of SC activity is needed for Anti performance. Instead, as Everling and Johnston (2013) proposed, task-relevant information may flow from PFC to SC neurons to facilitate goal-directed responses. Nevertheless, whether the flow of task information is unidirectional, from the PFC to the SC, or whether the SC also sends task-relevant information back to the PFC (through feedback projections via the mediodorsal thalamus) remains to be determined.
General Discussion
Here, we provided a rodent ProAnti task-switching behavior that, to our knowledge, is the most closely parallel to comparable primate tasks in its structure, its timing, and its cued single-trial, seconds-timescale sensorimotor remapping. The resulting rat behavior demonstrates numerous behavioral parallels to that of primates. This suggests that the relevant neural circuit mechanisms in rodents, which are of interest in their own right, may also be comparable to, and could illuminate, circuit mechanisms in primates. Given the experimental tractability of rodents, we believe that the rat ProAnti paradigm will be a powerful animal model for studying the neural basis of executive control, response inhibition, and task switch cost (Miller and Cohen, 2001; Stoet and Snyder, 2009) .
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES Subjects
Animal use procedures were approved by the Princeton University Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee and carried out in accordance with NIH standards. All subjects were adult male Long-Evans rats (Taconic) placed on a restricted water schedule to motivate them to work for a water reward.
The ProAnti Orienting Behavior Behavioral Training
We trained 13 rats on the ProAnti orienting behavior (Figure 1 ). Rats went through several stages of an automated training protocol ( Figure S1 ). In the final stage, each trial began with an LED turning on in the center port, cuing the rats to poke there and initiate a trial. Rats were required to keep their nose in the center port (nose fixation) until the light turned off as a ''Go'' signal (Figure 1B) . Broken fixation trials were ignored in all analyses. The duration of the fixation period was 1.5 s, and the task cue sound was played during the first 1 s. Task cues were clearly distinguishable FM modulated sounds, with different carrier and modulation frequencies, and were counterbalanced in different animals. After the task sound ended, the next 500 ms of nose fixation consisted of a silent delay period, after which the center light was extinguished and rats were allowed to withdraw from the center port. Then, a target stimulus would be presented by turning on one of the side port LEDs; this remained on until rats poked into one of the two side ports. For Pro trials, rats were rewarded for orienting to the side port with the light; for Anti trials, rats were rewarded for orienting to the side port without the light. A correct choice was rewarded by 24 ml of water; and an incorrect choice resulted in a loud sound, no reward delivery, and a short trial-terminating time-out. Task-Switch Paradigm We first trained rats (n = 13) to perform alternating blocks of Pro and Anti trials, where block switches occurred within single sessions, after a minimum of 15 trials per block, and when a local estimate of performance (over the last ten trials in this block) reached a threshold of 70% correct. We then trained five rats to perform completely interleaved Pro and Anti trials. To accurately assess the effect of inactivations, all cannulated rats (n = 6 rats) were trained on the random-block design, where block switches were not dependent on the local estimate of performance. Instead, the length for each block was drawn randomly from a Gaussian distribution (mean = 15, SD = 5, maximum = 25 trials per block).
Cannula Implant Surgery
Surgical methods were identical to those described previously (Erlich et al., 2011; see also Supplemental Experimental Procedures) . Rats (n = 6) were implanted bilaterally in mPFC (+3.2 anteroposterior [AP] mm, ±0.75 mediolateral [ML] mm from bregma) and in SC (À6.8 AP mm, ±1.8 ML mm) with 22-gauge guide cannulae (four cannulae per animal). The final depth of the injector (28 AWG) was 3.2 mm below the brain surface for mPFC and 4.8 mm for SC, targeting PL and the intermediate and deep layers of the SC (Figure 5 ).
Infusions
Infusions were performed once a week to minimize adaptation to the effects of muscimol and to have stable performance in sessions 1 day before infusions. These control sessions were used as a baseline reference for characterizing the inactivation results. We also performed isoflurane and saline control experiments (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures). For bilateral infusions, 0.3 ml of 0.25 mg/ml muscimol was infused in each brain area (0.075 mg per site, 0.150 mg in total). Considering the hemispheric competition, a lower dose was used (0.3 ml of 0.125 mg/ml) for unilateral infusions. Previous experiments in the rat (Krupa et al., 1999; Martin, 1991) suggest that the inactivated area at these doses would have an $1-mm radius. Unilateral inactivations were balanced between infusing the left and right sides of the brain in all individual rats.
Analysis and Statistics
All analyses and statistics were computed in MATLAB (The Mathworks). A paired Student's t test was used to compare Pro and Anti behavioral characteristics across sessions. Bootstrap or permutation tests were used for all across-rat analyses. To characterize behavioral biases after unilateral inactivations, a repeated-measures two-way ANOVA was conducted to test the within-subject main effect of task (Pro versus Anti), side (ipsiversus contralateral movement) and interaction (Task 3 Side). Similarly, a two-way ANOVA was used to test the effect of errors on subsequent switch cost. 
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental Information includes Supplemental Experimental
